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People v. Scott2881
(decided October 4, 1993)
2 883
Defendant claimed that his Federal2 882 and New York State

constitutional right to be protected against an unreasonable search
and seizure2884 was violated because police officers lacked
probable cause to search and arrest him. 2 885 Defendant also
claimed that he was denied the right to effective assistance of
counsel as guaranteed by both the Federal2 886 and the New York
State Constitutions. 2887 The court held that the police officers
had probable cause to arrest and search the defendant, 28 88 since
the officers had received a radio transmission describing an
armed perpetrator in the vicinity, and upon defendant's
insufficient response to the officer's inquiry. 2 889 Additionally,
the court held that the defendant was not denied effective
assistance of counsel, 2890 stating that "true ineffectiveness of
counsel should not be confused with an unsuccessful trial

strategy." 2 891

Two Housing Police Officers were notified by radio
transmission that officers from the 78th precinct were in hot
2881. 197 A.D.2d 550, 602 N.Y.S.2d 208 (2d Dep't 1993).
2882. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure intheir
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, .

.

. but upon probable cause ....

").

2883. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... but upon probable cause .

.

2884. Scott, 197 A.D.2d at 551, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
2885. Id.
2886. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.").
2887. Scott, 197 A.D.2d at 551, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 209; see also N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 6 ("In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall
be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil
actions ..

").

2888. Scott, 197 A.D.2d at 551, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
2889. Id.
2890. Id.
2891. Id.at 551, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 209-10.
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pursuit of four black males in a red Honda. 2892 The men had just,
committed an armed bank robbery and they were driving in the
direction of a post office/supermarket complex. 2893 The two
officers observed the police vehicle near the complex but did not
see the red Honda. 2894 The two officers drove into the parking
lot complex and were directed by a postal employee down an
alley, where they observed the defendant, Michael Scott, a black
male, running for a fence. 2 895 The officers then drove down the
alley where the defendanit was climbing the fence, embarked from
their vehicle with their weapons drawn and ordered the defendant
to "stop, [and] not to move." 2 896 The officer's inquired as to
where defendant was going, and he replied, that "he was going
shopping." 2897 The officers ordered the defendant off the
fence. 2 898 As Scott was making his descent from the fence, one
of the officers grabbed him and detected a hard object in the
defendant's waistband. 2899 The object was subsequently
determined to be a two-way radio. 2 900 Thereafter, a search of the
defendant resulted in the finding of a sheet of paper containing
"various
radio frequencies
and corresponding
police

precincts. "2901
The court first decided whether it was proper for the police to
draw their guns and order the defendant off the fence based on
the information they received from the initial radio transmission,
and the defendant's attempt to flee the complex area by climbing
over the fence. 2902 The court relied on People v. Chestnut2903 in
deciding this issue. In Chestnut, officers received a radio
2892. Id. at 550, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 209.

2893.
2894.
2895.
2896.
2897.
2898.
2899.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 550-51, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
Id. at 551, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 209
Id.
Id.
Id.

2900. Id.
2901. Id.
2902. Id.

2903. 51 N.Y.2d 14, 409 N.E.2d 958, 431 N.Y.S. 485, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1018 (1980).
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,transmission which described an armed perpetrator. 2904 The
officers, who were on an anti-crime patrol, had observed the
defendant behaving suspiciously. 2905 The officer approached the
defendant, followed by his partner, and drew his gun, ordering
defendant to "freeze" and "lay on the ground.- 2906 The Chestnut
court held that the officers were justified in drawing their guns
since they believed that the defendant had just committed armed
robbery and quite possibly still armed. 2907 Similarly, the court in
Scott reasoned that the two officers were justified in their actions
since they believed defendant to be a perpetrator of an armed
bank robbery, based on the radio transmission and his attempt to
scale a fence to flee the complex. 290 8
The court next determined that it was reasonable for the
officer, who had felt a hard object on the defendant's waist, to
retrieve the object. 2909 In support of this conclusion, the court
cited People v. Woods. 2 910 In Woods, the court held that in light

of past experiences with the defendant, it was not unreasonable
for an officer "to pat defendant in the chest area when defendant
quickly reached toward the breast area of his jacket, and for that
officer, upon feeling a hard object, to reach inside the jacket and
retrieve it."2911 The court in Scott apparently felt that Ferris,
"upon feeling a hard object" as in Woods, was acting reasonably

2904. Id. at 17, 409 N.E.2d at 959, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
2905. Id.
2906. Id. at 18, 409 N.E.2d at 960, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 487; see also.People v.
Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 379, 538 N.E.2d 323, 540 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1989) (stating
officers had probable cause to handcuff defendants based on radio
transmissions that described four armed perpetrators which resembled
defendants and defendants were found at the crime scene); People v. Castro,
53 N.Y.2d 1046, 425 N.E.2d 888, 442 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1981) (holding officers

had reasonable suspicions to stop defendant based on the scope and intensity of
the circumstances at hand).
2907. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d at 21, 409 N.E.2d at 961, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 489.

2908. Scott, 197 A.D.2d at 551, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
2909. Id.
2910. 64 N.Y.2d 736, 475 N.E.2d 442, 485 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1984).
2911. Id. at 737, 475 N.E.2d at 442, 485 N.Y.S.2d 975.
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in retrieving the object, since he believed Scott had just

29 12
committed an armed robbery.
In addition, the court held that the officers had probable cause
to arrest and search the defendant. 2 913 The basis of the probable
cause was the defendant telling the parties that "he was going
shopping" in response to their inquiry, combined with the
discovery of the two-way radio. 2 914 The court came to its
conclusion based on the reasoning set forth by the court in People

v. Hollman.2 9 15

In Holtman, the arresting police officer witnessed defendants
boarding a bus with an orange bag and black knapsack and

2 916
placing it in an overhead rack a few seats away from them.

The officer asked defendants whether they had checked their
luggage, to which defendants responded by saying that they had
no luggage. 2 9 17 Next, the officer asked defendants if they knew
who owned the orange bag and black knapsack, to which they

responded that they did not. 2918 Although the court in Holtman
was concerned with the larger issues as to whether or not the
2912. Scott, 197 A.D.2d at 551, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
2913. Id.
2914. Id.
2915. 79 N.Y.2d 181, 590 N.E.2d 204, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1992); see also
People v. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d 1056, 1058, 619 N.E.2d 396, 398, 601
N.Y.S.2d 459, 461 (1993) (holding that defendant's flight from police officers
and observation that defendant had a bulge in his jacket did not provide
sufficient reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify pursuit); People v.
Bronston, 68 N.Y.2d 880, 501 N.E.2d 579, 508 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1986). The
court held that defendant's presence on a fire escape and the fact the
description of defendant's clothing was consistent with a report of a burglary in
process, did not provide police with sufficient reason to order defendant down
at gun point and frisk him, without first inquiring as to why he was on the fire
escape. Id. at 881, 501 N.E.2d at 580, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 931; People v.
Hunter, 30 N.Y.2d 774, 284 N.E.2d 879, 333 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1972). In
Hunter, the court held that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the
defendant based on the time of night, the fact that there had previously been
numerous burglaries in that area and defendant's unsatisfactory response to
officers questions. Id. at 776, 284 N.E.2d at 879, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
2916. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 186, 590 N.E.2d at 206, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
2917. Id.
2918. Id. at 193, 590 N.E.2d at 211, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
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questions asked by the officer were "requests for information" or
a "common-law right to inquire," 29 19 the court in Scott
concentrated on the Holiman court's discussion of sufficient
probable cause. 2920 By affirming the officer's arrest of the
defendant in Hollman,2 9 2 1 that court concluded that the officer's
observance of defendant, in combination with defendant's
responses to questions, presented the officer with sufficient
probable cause to search the bags and arrest the defendant.
Similarly, in Hunter, the court held that the arresting officer
had sufficient probable cause to arrest the defendant, based on the
circumstances which included "the time of night and the place, a

construction area consisting largely of abandoned buildings where
there had been numerous prior burglaries," and an
2919. Id. In Hollman, the court concluded that the officer's initial question as
to whether the defendants checked their bags or not was a legitimate "request
for information" that was supported by a credible reason, but indicative of
possible criminality. Id. The court said that the officer's question to defendant
Hollman of whether or not he knew the owner of the orange bag and black
knapsack was of a higher standard of intrusiveness and came under the
officer's "common-law right of inquiry" and was supported by the officer's
belief that "criminality was afoot." Id. These two types of questions represent
the first and second tier of the De Bour four-tier approach. Id. at 184-85, 590
N.E.2d at 205-06, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 620-21; see also People v. De Bour, 40
N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, (1976). The Hollman court
described the four-tier method of analysis, which also includes the third tier,
"where a police officer has reasonable suspicion that a particular person" was
involved in a crime the officer may forcibly stop or detain him and the fourth
tier which states that if an officer "has sufficient probable cause to believe that
a person has committed a crime" the officer may arrest that person. 79 N.Y.2d
at 185, 590 N.E.2d at 205-06, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 620-21 (citing De Bour, 40
N.Y.2d at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384-85 (1976)).
2920. This appears to be true because after the court states that the officers
had sufficient probable cause to arrest the defendant, specifically cited to the
Hollman case, in which the court discussed the third and fourth tiers of the De
Bour method. The court noticeably fails to cite to, and thus meant to exclude
from their reasoning, the first and second tiers of the De Bour method, which
consists of what type of question was asked and whether an officer had a right
to ask such question. Scott, 197 A.D.2d at 551, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 209 (citing
Hollian, 79 N.Y.2d at 185, 590 N.E.2d at 205-06, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 620-21).
2921. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 196, 590 N.E.2d at 212-13, 581 N.Y.S.2d at
627-28.
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"unsatisfactory response" from defendant to the officers
2
questions. 292
The court in Scott held that the officers initially had reason to
inquire of defendant's whereabouts under the prevailing
circumstances. 2923 Based on the defendant's insufficient response
to the inquiry and the finding of the two-way radio, the court
held that the officers had sufficient probable cause to arrest and
search defendant. 2924
Finally, defendant claimed he was denied effective assistance of
counsel. 2 925 The court refused to give this claim any significant
value since the defendant could not show that his counsel's
performance had hindered his representation to the extent that it
was "less than meaningful."2926

2922. Hunter, 30 N.Y.2d at 774, 284 N.E.2d at 879, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
2923. Scott, 197 A.D.2d at 551, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
2924. Id.
2925. Id.; see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
2926. Scott, 197 A.D.2d at 551, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 210; see also People v.
Garcia, 75 N.Y.2d 973, 974, 555 N.E.2d 902, 902, 556 N.Y.S.2d 505, 505
(1990) (holding that defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
failed even though counsel did not make a challenge for a warrantless arrest
because counsel had sound reasons for this choice); People v. Rivera, 71
N.Y.S.2d 705, 709, 525 N.E.2d 698, 700, 530 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (1988)
(holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails unless a showing can
be made that there was no strategic or legitimate explanation for counsel's
failure to act); People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 148, 429 N.E.2d 400, 406,
444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 899 (1981). In Baldi, the court held that counsel used a
risky tactic by letting defendant take the stand, but did so consistent with the
defense of insanity. The attorney also used his experience to provide a
competent defense. Id. Cf. People v. Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d 394, 380 N.E.2d 272,
458 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1978). In Aiken, the court noted that there are a few
standards to determine if a counsel's representation has been ineffective. Id. at
398, 380 N.E.2d at 274-75, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 447. The court described these
standards as ranging from the traditional standard that counsel's representation
made the "trial a farce and a mockery of justice," to the more stringent
standard of "reasonable competence" developed by the federal courts. Id.
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